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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 900201

Plaintiff/Petitioner,
vs.

Category No. 13
ERLENE KAY STRIEBY,
Defendant/Respondent.
OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether

the

decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

reversing

respondent's manslaughter conviction, which accepted the District
Court's credibility findings and utilized and applied the proper
standard of review for a bench trial, is an appropriate case for an
exercise of this Court's supervisory power. See Utah R. App. P. 46.
REPORT OF OPINION
The subject decision has been reported in 131 Utah Adv. Rep.
81 (Utah Ct. App., March 30, 1990); slip op. No. 8901240-CA.
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
The decision of the Court of Appeals reversing respondent's
conviction for manslaughter was entered on March 30, 1990.

No

rehearing was ordered.
decision

by

a writ

This Court has jurisdiction to review the

of certiorari

pursuant

to Utah Code Ann.f

§ 78-2-2(3) (a) (Supp. 1989), § 78-2a-4 (1986).
STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Appendix).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November

30, 1988, respondent was found

guilty by the

District Court, sitting without a juryf of manslaughter.
dent was also found not guilty of second degree murder.

Respon-

On January

9, 1989f the District Court sentenced her to a term of imprisonment
of not less than one year, nor more than 15 years.
Court further

The District

ordered her to pay restitution to the decedent's

family (her in-laws) in an amount to be set by the Board of Pardons
at the time of release.

On January 18, 1989, respondent filed a

motion for a new trial, supported by an affidavit, based on certain
findings made by the District Court at the time it rendered its
verdict.

On February 8, 1989, the District Court denied respon-

dent's motion for a new trial.

On appeal to the Utah Court of

Appeals, the conviction was reversed.
Adv. Rep. 81

State v. Strieby, 131 Utah

(Utah Ct. App. March 30, 1990); slip op. No. 890124-

CA.3/

- In light of its disposition, the Court of Appeals did not
need to decide whether the District Court erroneously denied respondent's motion for a new trial or improperly ordered restitution.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of July 8, 1988f in Tooele County, Ms. Sandy
Magana heard someone crying, looked out the window of her condominium

and

saw

hysterically.

Kay Strieby,

the

respondent

herein,

sobbing

Mrs. Strieby came to Ms. Magana's door and asked her

to call the paramedics because Chris Strieby, the decedent, had
been shot.

Mrs. Strieby told Ms. Magana that she shot the decedent

because he was beating
coming."

her and would

(R. 136 at 126-132).

not stop but

"just kept

Ms. Magana called the police at

approximately 6:38 p.m.
Officers

from

the Tooele

County

Sheriff's office

promptly

arrived on the scene and noted that Mrs. Strieby was extremely
upset, had a swollen eye, a swollen lip and a mark on her forehead.
(R. 136 at 38-42).
Detective Alan James and Sheriff Don Proctor took a taped
statement from Mrs. Strieby following the shooting as she sat in
the

sheriff's

Exhibit

car

at

the

(St. Ex.) #14).

scene

(hereinafter

cited

as State's

Mrs. Strieby told Detective James and

Sheriff Proctor that she and the decedent had been arguing since
the previous day.

On the morning of July 8, she got up early in

order to be at work in Grantsville by 6:00 a.m.

After work, she

went home, did some housework and then went to the Strieby welding
shop in Tooele to talk with the decedent.

They arguedf and the

decedent told Mrs. Strieby she "was a cunt and not to come around
him anymore ...".

He gave her the "finger," and she left and drove
-3-

to the Eagle's, a private club in Tooele, where she talked with
friends and had a few drinks.

She then returned to the Strieby

welding trailer to pick up the decedent.

She and the decedent

argued again and the argument ended with him knocking her down.
Mrs. Strieby then called a friend who came and took her home.

(St.

Ex. #14 at 2, 7-8).
Don McCord, the decedent's best friend, was at Strieby Welding
drinking with the decedent on the day in question.

Mr. McCord

testified that he and the decedent had been drinking all day and
that the decedent had already drunk approximately two-thirds of a
fifth of vodka when Mrs. Strieby
afternoon.

returned

to the trailer that

By that time, he and the decedent were drinking from a

fresh half gallon of vodka.

After Mrs. Strieby left, McCord and

the decedent continued to drink their half gallon.

(R. 136 at

68-71, 81-85).
When Mrs. Strieby got home, she lay down to rest for a few
minutes.

When the decedent's nephew and his friend, both of whom

were staying at the Striebys1, came home, Mrs. Strieby asked them
to drive to the trailer and bring the
gets too drunk."

decedent home

"before he

(St. Ex. #14 at 2). The boys went to the trailer

and found the decedent still drinking.

They persuaded him to go

with them and dropped him off outside the condominium shortly after
6:25 p.m. without going inside.

(R. 136 at 107-113).

As soon as the boys left, the decedent entered the condominium
and immediately began yelling obscenities at Mrs. Strieby while
-4-

grabbing

her and threatening

to kill her.

As Mrs. Strieby told

Detective James:
I opened the door and the kids left and he
just, just started hitting me and started
calling me names and saying I did things I
didn't
[Hie said, "I'll kill ya.n
He
said, "I'll beat you to death.
No wonder
your first husband beat you. You're a mouthy
bitch."
Mrs.

Strieby

repeatedly

pleaded

with

the

decedent

to leave her

alone, and also asked him to give her a few days and she would move
out.

But he refused:
[Hie said, "I ain't giving you no time at
all." ... I said, "Chris you can't be like
this," and he said he'd kill me, he'd beat me
to death.
He said, "If the beatin' you
thought you got at dad's trailer was bad
today, you wait until I get ahold of you
again."

(St. Ex. #14 at 3-4, 8 ) .
Mrs. Strieby pulled

away from the decedent's grasp and ran

away from him up the stairs.

The decedent grabbed Mrs. Strieby by

the leg and dragged her down the stairs on her back and neck.

Mrs.

Strieby again asked the decedent, "please ... just leave me alone, I
just, give me a couple a days," but the decedent was "grabbing" and
"shaking" her, so she struggled free and ran upstairs.
#14 at 4; R. 136 at 163).

(St. Ex.

Although Mrs. Strieby was too shaken to

recall exactly how she got the decedent's gun from their bedroom
closet, she had

it when

he charged

at her up the stairs.

begged him to quit beating her, but the decedent kept coming:

-5-

She

He said.... "I'll kill you before you can
pull the trigger." He told me to go in and
pull the trigger.
He could knock me down
four times before I could pull the trigger.
There wasn't enough dust to bury him....
(St. Ex.

#14 at

4, 8).

Mrs. Strieby

decedent not to hit her again.

again pleaded

with the

He told her to "Pull the trigger

you fucking bitch, cause it ain't loaded and I can make it up the
stairs before you pull it anyway."

(St. Ex. #14 at 8).

As the

decedent came charging up the second flight of stairs from the
landingf he again told her that he was going to kill herf and she
fired one shot which killed him.
scene

that

Almighty.

"I don't

really

Mrs. Strieby recalled on the

remember

pulling

the

trigger, God

It hurt my arm, it threw my arm clear back and I am so,

oh God Almighty ... it was horrible.
neck is sore, my back is sore.

It was terrible.

I, oh my

He really whopped me a good one in

the neck and my neck is really sore but I didn't mean to hurt
him...."

(St. Ex. #14 at 5, 8).

After her arrest, Mrs. Strieby

was taken to the emergency room at the local hospital for treatment
for the neck and back injuries sustained during the beating.
Dr. Edward Sweeney, the state medical examiner who examined
the body, testified that the decedent was a "heavyset man" weighing

about

200

pounds

with

a

"muscular

development."

The

decedent's alcohol level was .25 milligrams percent, or approximately three times the legal limit for the State of Utah.
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Dr.

Sweeney testified that alcohol affects the highest levels first those "that separate man from animal."
that the decedent's
been affected at his

self-control

Dr. Sweeney also testified

and judgment would clearly have

.25 blood alcohol content.- (R. 136 at 117-

121) .
Mrs. Strieby testified

in her own defense and elaborated on

and expanded her voluntary statement to Detective James and Sheriff
Proctor.

Her

statement

at

credible.

trial
the

testimony

scene,

(R. 135 at 4 ) .

and

was
the

consistent
trial

with

judge

her

found

earlier

it

to

be

Mrs. Strieby testified that in April of

1988, after having known each other for several years and having
previously
married.

lived

togetherf

Mrs.

Strieby

and

the

decedent

were

At the time of the marriage, the decedent was estranged

from and had no contact with his father and brothers.

A few months

later, however, he had begun spending time with his family again.
Since that time and in the two months immediately prior to July 8,

- T h e State erroneously asserts that, based on the decedent's
blood alcohol content, his ability to move was "obviously" impaired.
State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, n.l.
The clear
weight of the evidence does not support this assertion. Indeed, as
the Court of Appeals correctly stated, "tt]here is little, if any,
evidence in the record to support the trial judge's conclusion that
Chris's coordination was impaired by alcohol to the extent that he
was not a serious threat to defendant.... [Dr. Sweeny] testified
that a .25 blood alcohol content would strongly affect self-control
and judgment, and might affect coordination, but to a lesser
extent.... [Defendant's actual injuries illustrate that Chris was
fully capable of seriously harming defendant."
State v. Strieby,
131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 83.
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the decedent had become emotionally upset due to problems with his
family.

He

tempered.

began

drinking

excessively

and

became

very short-

(R. 137 at 218-226).

On July 7, 1988, the decedent was angry because he had not had
sex for some time, and he blamed Mrs. Strieby.

He told her that if

he did not get sex from her soon he would "go someplace else for
it."

Mrs. Strieby told him that his excessive drinking was the

cause of the problem since he was unable to maintain an erection
when drunk.

She told the decedent that if he drank less they

probably could have sex.
Approximately

twenty

Mrs. Strieby then went upstairs to bed.

minutes

later, the

decedent

followed

her

upstairs, slapped her in the face with his penis and demanded sex.
Mrs. Strieby asked him to leave her alone.

The decedent then

"jumped on" Mrs. Strieby and attempted to have intercourse with her
"from behind".
on the couch.

The decedent eventually went downstairs and slept
(R. 136 at 229-230).

The following evening when the decedent was brought home by
his nephew, he immediately attacked Mrs. Strieby.

The decedent was

substantially bigger and stronger than Mrs. Strieby.

Although they

had argued in the past, he had never before attacked her as he did
that night.

He had also never before threatened to kill her.

Mrs. Strieby testified that "the door flew open" and the attack
began.

He began beating her and calling her names.

When Mrs.

Strieby asked for some time in order to leave, he told her she
"didn't have any time."

Although she tried to open and escape

-8-

through the front door, the decedent slammed it shut.

He told her

that "two other women had left him, and the only way

[she] could

leave was on a stretcher."

(R. 136 at 240-241).

As she tried to protect herself from the decedent's attack in
the entryway, Mrs. Strieby ran up the stairs to the landing.
decedent
leg.

grabbed

The

her and pulled her back down the stairs by her

As she was pulled down the steps, her head hit the landing

and stairs.

Mrs. Strieby had broken her back before and had a long

history

serious

of

surgeries.
problems.

back

injuries,

including

four

prior

back

The decedent was aware of her prior surgeries and back
To protect herself, she said she "put my hands up and

tried to double my body up so I would —

I was scared because of my

back, and I was scared because of my head.
hurt my head bad.

I didn't know if I had

He just wouldn't leave me alone."

(R. 137 at

241-244).
Throughout the attack, the decedent told Mrs. Strieby that he
was going to kill her.

She testified:

I had never seen him like this. I had never
seen his eyes — I had never seen his face
contorted
to
the
point
where
he
was
completely uncontrollable, where he —
I
couldn't talk to him.
He just kept saying,
"I am going to kill you, you bitch.
I am
going to kill you, you bitch.
You don't
deserve to live." And he just — he wouldn't
stop.... But all this time he was telling me
he was going to kill me. And he told me —
just screaming things at me. Just screaming
... He was screaming obscenities, and things
that — sometimes he didn't even make sense.
I was scared by then.
So scared of him I
knew that he was going to kill me. And he
said he was going to kill me.
(R. 137 at 242-243).
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As the decedent struck out at Mrs. Strieby, she pushed him in
the direction of the kitchen and ran up the stairs again.

Mrs.

Strieby could hear the decedent yelling at her, but did not know if
he was in the kitchen or on his way up the stairs.
245).

(R. 137 at

He told her "I'm going to kill you, you bitch.

embarrassed me enough, and I am going to kill you."
testified that "he just —
kept coming.

You've just
Mrs. Strieby

he kept coming up the stairs.

He just

And he kept screaming at me that he could get me

before I could shoot him...."

As the decedent continued up the

stairs in pursuit of her, Mrs. Strieby fired one shot from his gun,
killing him.

(R. 137 at 245-246).

Mrs. Strieby was taken to the Tooele Valley Hospital emergency
room where she was examined by Dr. Mark Anderson for her neck pain
and other injuries.

At trial, Dr. Anderson testified that based on

Mrs. Strieby's pain and the numbness in her hands, he thought that
Mrs. Strieby

had

cervical disk.

suffered

either

a broken neck

or a ruptured

Dr. Anderson stated that four prior back surgeries

for one individual is

"extremely unusual" and that Mrs. Strieby's

range of motion in her back and neck was generally less than half
that of normal.

In addition, Dr. Anderson testified that Mrs.

Strieby had bruises on various parts of her body, including bruises
that were in the shape of fingers, "a classic description of somebody being grabbed with the fingers very hard."
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She also had

multiple
neck.

abrasions, a swollen left eye and a tender area on her

(R. 137 at 194-201).
Dr. Anderson also testified that Mrs. Strieby's injuries were

consistent with being dragged down stairs on her neck and back and
with trying to escape an attack.

Dr. Anderson further stated that

being dragged down stairs on one's neck and back could certainly
cause death or serious bodily injury.

In fact, Dr. Anderson stated

that because of Mrs. Strieby's back problems and prior surgeries,
serious bodily injury was more likely for her.

For someone in her

condition, Dr. Anderson testified, being dragged
could have caused her paralysis or death.
At

the

respondent
verdict,

conclusion
guilty

the

of

District

of

the

case,

manslaughter.
Court

stated

(R. 137 at 203-204).

the

District

However,
that

reason to doubt Mrs. Strieby's version."

down the stairs

in

it had

Court
rendering

"no

found
its

substantial

(R. 135 at 4 ) .

In fact,

the District Court specifically found that the decedent had resumed
beating Mrs. Strieby upon arriving home and further indicated that
it had "no substantial doubt about the reality" of her fear for her
life, given the decedent's "powerful muscular build."
6).

(R. 135 at

The Court of Appeals adopted and accepted the District Court's

credibility

findings.

The Court

of Appeals

concluded,

however,

that the District Court's verdict was against the clear weight of
evidence.

State v. Strieby, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 83.

ARGUMENT
A.

A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS INAPPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE.

There are no "special and important reasons" for this Court to
exercise its judicial discretion to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals in this case.

See Utah R. App. P. 46. This case

does not involve (1) a decision by a panel of the Court of Appeals
in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of
Appeals on the same issue; (2) a decision on a question of state or
federal
decision

law

in conflict with a decision of this Court;

that has so far departed

(3) a

from the accepted and usual

course of judicial proceedings to call for an exercise of this
Court's power of supervision; or, (4) an important question of
municipal, state or federal law which has not been, but should be,
settled by this Court, Ici.
Most importantly, this case does not involve, as the State
erroneously suggests in its petition, a case where the Court of
Appeals made a credibility determination in conflict with the trier
of fact.

In that regard, Sweeney Land Company v. Kimball, 786 P.2d

760 (Utah 1990), cited by the State, does not support its position.
In that case, this Court reversed the Court of Appeals which had
made a determination of a witness' credibility in direct conflict
with that of the trial court.
court's

determination

regarding

As this Court noted, "[t]he trial
[the witness']

credibility

was

exactly

the

type

of

determination

protect on appeal."
court

Ij3. at 761.

that

rule

52(a)

is meant

to

In the present case, the trial

made an express finding that it had "no substantial reason
Mrs. Striebyfs version" and that given the decendent's

to doubt

"powerful muscular build" there was "no substantial doubt about the
reality of her

fear

for her life."

(R. 135 at 4, 6); State v.

Strieby, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 83.
Unlike Sweeney, the Court of Appeals in this case did not make
a

credibility

determination

in

conflict

with

the

trial

court.

Instead, the Court of Appeals utilized and applied the appropriate
standard of review for a bench trial and concluded that the trial
court's verdict was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.
State v. Strieby, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 83.

In fact, even the

dissent acknowledged that the majority used the appropriate test,
but

it

simply

disagreed

weight of the evidence.
84.

In

doing

erroneously

so,

referred

with

the

majority's

assessment

of

the

State v. Strieby, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at

however,

the

dissent,

to the testimony

not

the

of Don McCord

majority,

in which he

claimed that Mrs. Strieby threatened the decedent.

The District

Court never

testimony in

reaching

referred

its

verdict

to this thoroughly discredited
and,

in

fact,

expressly

credited

Mrs.

Strieby's testimony of events which was inconsistent with McCord's.
Accordingly, this case presents nothing more than the State's
disagreement with the Court

of Appeals' considered

judgment that

the trial court's verdict was against the clear weight of the
evidence and that a mistake had been made.
B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DECIDED THE CASE.

The decision of the Court of Appeals correctly applied the
standard of review for a verdict rendered in a bench trial.

As

already noted, the Court of Appeals credited the District Court's
findings on credibility, but found that the District Court's guilty
verdict was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence and that
the State had failed to prove the absence of self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt.

State v. Strieby, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 83.

As the Court of Appeals noted, the standard of review to be
applied following a bench trial is more probing and less deferential than that applied following a jury trial.
131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 82.

State v. Strieby,

The Court of Appeals relied upon

State

v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988) in support of its position.
In Goodman, this Court noted:
When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the trial
court's judgment unless it is "against the
clear weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made." ...
[T]his standard accords "appropriate recognition of the relative deference
owed multi-member panels as opposed to singlejudge findings." Under this less deferential
standard, the likelihood that a defendant's
conviction will be reversed following a bench

-14-

trial, as opposed to a jury trial, is increased.... [T]his standard requires that the
clear weight of the evidence presented at
trial not be contrary to the verdict.... Even
if the clear weight of the evidence supports
the verdict, however, this Court will reverse
if it otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made, thus
providing the defendant an additional opportunity to obtain a reversal.... In reviewing a
bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence,
we require that the weight of the evidence,
discounting
questions
of
credibility
and
demeanor, not oppose the verdict.
Hence, a
defendant's conviction must still be based on
evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but, on appeal, the standard of
review aids the defendant in his efforts to
obtain a reversal....
Id. at 786-87 (footnotes and citations omitted).
Applying

these principles to the instant case, the Court of

Appeals found that the trial court's verdict was against the clear
weight of the evidence and that the State had failed to carry its
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. Strieby did
not act in self-defense.

State v. Strieby, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at

83; See State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985).
At
which

trial,

established

garding whether
Court

notwithstanding
that

at

clear

least

a

Mrs. Strieby acted

erroneously

concluded

that

and

overwhelming

reasonable

doubt

existed

re-

in self-defense, the District

Mrs. Strieby's

decedent was not legally justifiable.

shooting

of the

In delivering its verdict,

the District Court hypothesized that the decedent —
of his violent and ruthless attack on Mrs. Strieby —

-15-

evidence

in the midst
stopped and

"went into the kitchen and poured himself a drink,n and that, with
drink in hand, he then followed Mrs. Strieby upstairs.
8).

(R. 135 at

According to the trial court, when the decedent theoretically

paused long enough to fix a drink in the kitchen, there was a
"reasonable, substantial cessation" in the attack on Mrs. Strieby.
(R. 135 at 8).

This conclusion by the District Court is not

supported by a scintilla of evidence.

Indeed, there was absolutely

no evidence that the decedent fixed himself a drink during the heat
of the assault on his wife.
Nevertheless, in order to reach its verdict and explain the
presence of a blue cup and wet spot on the stairs, the trial court
inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that it was logical for the
decedent, in the midst of brutally attacking his wife, to stop and
fix a drink in the kitchen.

As the Court of Appeals found, the

trial court took a speculative leap across a major gap in the
evidence.

State v. Strieby, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 83.

v. Harmon, 767 P.2d
necessary

for

the

567, 568

Court

(Utah App. 1989).

See State

Although not

of Appeals' decision, and while Mrs.

Strieby had no burden whatsoever on this issue, a more logical and
probable

explanation

is that

the decedent brought

a partially

filled cup of liquor with him from the shop where he had been
drinking heavily all day and that it fell from his hand at some
point during the attack on his wife on the stairs.
least a doubt must exist on this issue.
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Certainly, at

More importantly, the Court of Appeals was free to reject the
trial court's conclusion on this point, as the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court did in Commonwealth v. Helm, 402 A.2d 500 (Pa. 1979), a case
remarkably similar to the present one.

In Helm, the appellant,

charged with the murder of her boyfriend, was found guilty in a
bench trial of manslaughter.

The prosecution's evidence of the

event largely consisted of the appellant's statement,

^d. at 502.

As was the case here, the trial court in Helm accepted the appellant's version but found that her fear was not reasonable.
503.

I<5. at

Thus, the issue on appeal was whether there was sufficient

evidence to establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, appellant

contended

that

she should have been acquitted

because the evidence raised the self-defense issue which the prosecution failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 503.

In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court squarely rejected the trial court's conclusion that
appellant's fear was not reasonable.

Id. at 504.

In a portion of

its ruling which is directly on point here, the Supreme Court
noted:
The trial court's conclusion that appellant
"could not have believed ... that it was
necessary to kill in order to save herself
from death or great bodily harm," is not a
finding of fact of the kind that must be
accepted by an appellate court. Although that
conclusion may be considered a factual one, it
is a conclusion which requires that certain
inferences first be drawn from the basic
facts. An appellate court is free to reject
such factual conclusions when they are not
sustained by the underlying facts....
-17-

Id, at 504 (citations omitted).

In Helm, the Court held that the

unarmed decedent's provocation was enough to cause a reasonable
belief by appellant that she was in danger of serious bodily harm
or death, noting that "[alt no time did appellant state that she
did not think herself in danger of serious bodily injury or death
from Harvey's unprovoked attack on her."

Ld. at 504.

The present case is more compelling for an acquittal than was
Helm.

Here, Mrs. Strieby testified, and Dr. Anderson confirmed,

that as a result of being knocked down and dragged down the stairs
on her back and head, she suffered actual severe bodily injury and
was in danger of death given her broken back and four prior back
surgeries.

Indeed, Dr. Anderson said that Mrs. Strieby suffered

severe bodily injury in the form of a ruptured cervical disk as a
result of the decedent's attack.

(R. 137 at 203).

Moreover, as the Court of Appeals found, the clear weight of
the

evidence

demonstrated

that

the decedent

vigorously pursued

respondent up the steps and repeatedly threatened to kill her as he
approached her on the steps.

The State argues that Mrs. Strieby1s

testimony that she pushed the decedent and he went into the kitchen
supports the trial court's inference regarding a reasonable and
substantial

cessation

in hostilities.

However, this illogicial

inference hardly evidences any cessation in hostilities much less a
reasonable

and

substantial

cessation

in

the

decedent's

attack

especially given the fact that the entire incident took place in a
few minutes and the decedent, in his irrational and drunken state,
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never stopped yelling at Mrs. Strieby and continued the attack by
coming up the stairs and screaming at Mrs. Strieby that he was
going to kill her.

(R. 137 at 245-246).

Indeed, as the Court of

Appeals held:
All the evidence other than the blue cup indicates that defendant reasonably believed
herself to be in imminent danger of serious
injury or death and that she had, indeed,
already suffered serious injury.
The trial
court did not doubt her credibility, but nevertheless engaged in pure speculation about a
cessation of hostilities.
While the trial
court's conclusions should be respected, the
conviction may not oppose the weight of the
evidence. Goodman, 763 P.2d at 787. We find
the court's guilty verdict contrary to the
clear weight of the evidence and, as a result,
that the State failed to prove the elements of
manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court of Appeals' decision was correct in every respect in
concluding, after careful consideration of the record, that the
trial judge's finding of guilty was against the clear weight of the
evidence in the face of overwhelming evidence of self-defense.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully requests that
this Court deny the State's petition for a writ of certiorari.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^M*** day of May, 1990.
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW

Neil A. Kaplan
Anneli R. Smith
Attorneys for Respondents
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APPENDIX
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
(a) Ef feet.
In all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to
Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth
the findings of fact and conclusions of law
which constitute the grounds of its action.
Requests for findings are not necessary for
purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the
extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It
will be sufficient if the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum
of decision filed by the court.
The trial
court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions,
except as provided in Rule 4 K b ) . The court
shall, however, issue a brief written statement
of the ground for its decision on all motions
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56,
and 59 when the motion is based on more than
one ground.
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